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Environmental Governance at the Core of Statecraft:  
Unresolved Questions and Inbuilt Tensions 
 
 
Abstract: The state is not only a main environmental player, but its involvement in 
environmental regulation has major consequences for the dynamics of statecraft. 
Environmental governance is the expression that better summarises the ongoing 
transformations of state interventions and the search for more flexible, adaptive 
approaches. A growing body of scholarly work has tried to establish the connections 
between the failures of environmental governance and the wider commitments of the 
state. What is largely missing in those studies is the synergy between environmental 
governance and the statecraft model put forward by Hegel in the early period of the 
industrial, liberal capitalism. Recent environmental policies have been particularly 
influenced by the Hegelian constitutional theory, especially considering the pursuit of 
legitimacy and flexibility. Consequently, the central challenge for geographers and 
other scholars of environmental governance is still to identify the changes in the 
rationale and configuration of the state apparatus and relate them to the wider political 
ecology of state action. 
 
 
The State as Environmental Player and Object of Contestation 
 
The growing global concern about environmental problems is, primarily, 
demonstration of the leadership, as well as of the failures, of state agencies and state-
led interventions. The state has become the main environmental player and its own 
initiatives are integral to processes of environmental change and politico-ecological 
rationalisation (Wissen 2009). State action is highly instrumental in the production of 
environmental knowledge and also in the coordination of the access to natural resources 
and ecosystems (Robbins 2000). Starting from the recognition of the environmental 
commitments and repercussions of state activity, the purpose of the present article is to 
examine the tensions and the apparent paradox between recent institutional adjustments 
and mounting environmental problems. The focus will be on environmental 
governance, which is the expression that better summarises the ongoing transformation 
of state policies and the search for more flexible regulatory approaches. Since the 
1980s, public policies and sectoral regulation (i.e. rules, rationalities and control 
systems) have evolved from rigid and end-of-the-pipe schemes to more elastic and 
interactive procedures associated with environmental governance. However, despite the 
persuasive rhetoric of state agencies in charge of environmental governance, the size 
and number of issues continue, for the most part, to increase. In order to understand the 
limitations of contemporary responses, the article will critically review the ideological 
influences and historico-geographical consequences of environmental governance. 
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The point of departure is to define the state as an institutional ensemble of power 
centres (Jessop 1982) that unfolds through different time-space scales, from local 
regulation to the realm of international relations (Brand and Görg 2008). Instead of a 
monolithic entity in charge of harmonised regulatory instruments, the ‘apparatus’ of the 
state contains dynamic structures and constantly evolving strategies that reflect the 
balance of political power and sociopolitical contestation (Lefebvre 2008). The 
apparatus of the state comprises the contested association between political society and 
civil society, as well as the politicised interactions between society and the rest of 
socionature (i.e. regarding here the hybrid ontology of the world, which is 
simultaneously and inextricably ‘social’ and ‘natural’). It is therefore pointless to 
dissociate the politicisation of state action and socioeconomic relations from the 
politicisation of socionatural questions. The state is not simply a detached administrator 
of environmental pressures, but an involvement in socionatural issues has direct effects 
on its organisation, functioning and legitimisation (Ioris 2012a). Following the 
observation of Gramsci (1971: 182), the state must be conceived of as a continuous 
process of “formation and superseding of unstable equilibria […] between the interests 
of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups”. Considering that the 
state is the main controller of the multiple intersections between spatial and temporal 
matrices (Poulantzas 1978), a Gramscian perspective can be particularly useful for the 
examination of the historical and spatial arrangements of the territorialised state (Ekers 
and Loftus 2013).  
The most relevant Gramscian term in that respect is hegemony, that is, the 
relationship of mobilisation, control and persuasion within and through political 
discourses. In the terrain of environmental politics, hegemony is described by Mann 
(2009) as having two separate moments that dynamically complement each other, one 
economic and another ethnopolitical. In the case of the current discussion, 
environmental governance can be understood as an expression of hegemonic 
environmental rationalities (in the Gramscian sense). For instance, the hegemony 
exerted by environmental governance has served to restrain other grassroots, critical 
reactions to the same environmental dilemmas. Having said that, the existing politico-
geographical literature needs to be expanded in order to embrace more fully the impact 
of institutional reforms on environmental regulation and also consider how the 
environmental sector has dialectically contributed to contemporary statecraft. In this 
manner, it should be possible to recognise the persistent impacts and increasing 
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disruption of ecosystems as the result of the largely inadequate socioecological 
responses that follow the politico-ecological commitments of the (capitalist) state. 
Regulation as environmental governance can be then recognised as an element of the 
pursuit of malleable forms of statecraft, a phenomenon that prioritises some politico-
institutional demands in a way that inscribes the balance of power in the production of 
socionature itself (see more on statecraft in Brenner 2004).  
The next sections deal with the rationale, achievements and failures of 
environmental governance, which reflect the long legacy of western European political 
theories that emerged in the early 19th Century. Before that, it will be revised the basis 
of environmental governance with special attention to the insufficiencies of other 
critical analyses so far.  
 
The Politics of Environmental Governance 
 
Already at the time of the Second Industrial Revolution, the rate and extent of 
environmental impacts of modern society were becoming increasingly evident. These 
prompted the introduction and gradual expansion of the early pieces of environmental 
legislation and the establishment of state agencies dedicated to problems such as water 
pollution, over use of resources and deforestation. A more comprehensive structure of 
regulation had to wait until after the Second World War, which was necessary to 
mitigate with the negative consequences of growing agro-industrial activity. Multilevel 
administrative systems were adopted by the industrialised countries and later replicated, 
through various strategies, to the rest of the world (such institutional dissemination 
process resembled the introduction of welfare and social protection strategies, although 
the rise of environmental legislation and policy-making soon surpassed the growth of 
the overall state apparatus). Probably the most relevant example of this ‘conventional’ 
mechanism of environmental regulation was the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) passed in the United States in 1969. The core section of NEPA institutionalised 
action-forcing provisions for federal agencies to enforce policies and regulatory goals. 
However, the conflict between development and conservation persisted during the 
implementation of conventional environmental regulation in the post-War decades 
(Ioris 2014). At the same time that environmental regulation like NEPA occupied a 
prominent role in the operation of the Keynesian state, the intensity of environmental 
risks and threats continued to increase. 
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The inefficiencies of the conventional, top-down model of environmental 
regulation, together with the liberalising reform of the state, prompted the transition to 
a more flexible and dynamic arrangement in the last decades of the century. The 
national state was also expected to produce cost-effective responses to old and newly 
discovered environmental problems (e.g. the ozone hole, climate change, endangered 
species, etc.). By the mid-1980s, it was clear that the limitations of conventional state 
interventions called for a speedy institutional reform able to address mounting pressures 
from civil society at national and international levels. There was a perceived need to 
move away from the narrow control of capital-labour relations into a more responsive 
eco-state formation capable of reworking state-socionature connections (While et al. 
2010). The inadequacies of conventional environmental regulation were likewise 
related to the spatial disjuncture between national territories and the space taken up by 
ecological problems, together with the persistent exploitation of resources and the 
apathy of wider society (Paterson et al. 2006). The main practical result was that, twenty 
years after the first global conference on the environment in Stockholm, in 1972, the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, in 1992, 
institutionalised sustainable development as the key concept on which to base 
environmental governance hereafter. 
Governance, instead of government interventions associated with conventional 
environmental statehood, contains a set of accommodating approaches aimed at 
facilitating environmental management and conservation. The European Commission 
(2001: 5) defines governance as “rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in 
which powers are exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness, 
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence”. In contrast to the 
prescriptive, centralised responses of the previous decades, the search for sustainability 
through environmental governance incarnated the argument for fresh associations 
between the state apparatus and non-state players, such as business sectors, NGOs, 
think-tanks, and so on. From the perspective of hegemonic groups and of those directly 
in charge of the state, the discourse behind environmental governance seemed to 
provide the rationality needed for overcoming the legitimisation and innovation deficit. 
Environmental governance was cleverly presented as something radically different 
from traditional environmental regulation, because it focused both on laws and policies 
and on informal institutions in a search for more effective organisational structures. 
Crucially, this process provided an opportunity for more sophisticated interventions 
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related to the promotion of a liberalised economic order and the affirmation of market-
based solutions to environmental degradation and conservation. 
In effect, rather than a complete transformation of conventional environmental 
statehood, the advance of environmental governance depended on the re-regulation of 
conservation and on the use of natural resources, which often combined state-oriented 
and market-oriented practices (Mansfield 2007). These are all elements of a ‘post-
political populist politics’ where capitalism is taken as given and there is no space left 
for alternative thinking, but social action must necessarily be contained within the 
existing state of affairs (Swyngedouw 2010). The experience in the European Union 
(EU) represents the best example of the pursuit of governance as the ultimate response 
to the need to maintain and legitimise the public sector’s authority over the 
interconnections between economy, society and the rest of nature. It could even be 
argued that the EU, after the Single European Act of 1987, took over from the USA in 
terms of environmental regulation leadership after the golden period of American 
environmental legislation in the 1970s. EU policies, directives and binding rules 
became characterised by a more conscientious association between economic demands 
and environmental protection with a gradual shift from centralised approaches towards 
an emphasis on the risks and benefits of more responsive strategies at a local level. 
As in the previous welfare-developmentalist phase, the control of socionature 
through environmental governance remained central to the realisation of state power 
(Whitehead 2008), while the promotion of novel responses increasingly reflected some 
of the critical tensions and disputes associated with the contemporary capitalist state. 
One of the main areas of scholarly concern here has been the contested and contingent 
relationship between environmental governance and the neoliberalising reforms of the 
state (Ioris 2012b). Neoliberalism has been recognised as a process that entails the 
reconfiguration of previous institutional arrangements and the ideological 
reconstruction of economic and non-economic interests (Brenner and Theodore 2002). 
This process depends also on the reorganisation of the entitlements of both humans and 
nonhumans (Bakker 2005), as an environmental management project (McCarthy and 
Prudham 2004) that combines valuation, enclosure and privatisation of nature under the 
name of environmental governance (Heynen and Robbins 2005). Environmental 
governance is actually championed by the neoliberalised state to be coherent with 
market-friendly policies and various forms of public-private collaboration that, in the 
end, contribute to reshape statecraft itself (Ioris 2013). 
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Nonetheless, despite the growing research on the neoliberalisation of 
socionature, there have been only limited efforts to position ecological politics inside 
the very process of neoliberal statecraft. Neoliberalisation happens through the 
implementation of uneven policies in different places and times, but the “architects of 
neoliberal ideas did not say much about the environment per se” (Castree 2010: 1732). 
There is, therefore, a pending need to improve the understanding how environmental 
policies informed by neoliberalism incorporate the conflict between the expansion of 
capital into ecosystem services and the management of socionatural elements in 
capitalist value forms (Robertson and Wainwright 2013). Comparable scholarly activity 
has been dedicated to the achievements and failures of the environmental responses 
under different state formations (e.g. Bernstein 2001; Conca 2006; Eckersley 2004), 
moreover such body of work normally falls short of establishing the connections 
between changing state patterns and the deep, class-based origins of socioecological 
problems.  
A related line of interpretation articulates the Foucauldian concepts of 
governmentality and biopower to expose environmental governance as a key element 
of ecological modernisation (Hajer 1995). Ecological modernisation uses the discourse 
of business to conceptualise environmental problems as a matter of inefficiency and 
excessive state control. Mainstream responses to climate change illustrate how a 
specifically designed governmentality renders climate politics governable, which 
coincided with the shift from biopower (i.e. the state apparatus that emerged in the 18th 
Century) to the advanced liberal state since the mid-1980s (Oels 2005). The process of 
governing climate change has involved particular ways of seeing and knowing the 
world making use of techno-bureaucratic tools such as carbon accounting (Lӧvbrand 
and Stripple 2011). Foucauldian-informed, poststructural accounts certainly offer a 
valuable contribution to understand core aspects of state practices and socioecological 
politics, however fail to address the wider interconnections between socioeconomic 
relations and the class allegiances that form the entirety of state politico-ecological 
commitments. Too much attention is paid to the diffuse metabolism of power and 
discourse, but not enough on environmental politics at the interface between economic 
and non-economic realms.    
 A common gap in governmentality-focuses analyses is the failure to perceive 
the transition to environmental governance as part of the perpetual process of state 
reconstruction that is needed to deal with the contradictions of contemporary globalised 
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society and the intrinsic limitations of the capitalist state. Environmental governance is 
nothing else than a highly specialised locus of political disputes embedded in the 
broader attempt to address the inconsistencies of a socioeconomic development model 
that privileges certain groups and spatial locations. The state “puts its stamp on 
geographical structures” to avoid the perpetual danger of capitalist incoherency and 
speculation (Harvey 2006). This process, which has been one of the central features of 
capitalist society, has evolved through concerted mechanisms of mystification and 
manipulation needed to disguise the unfair and crisis-prone effects of state-led 
development. Therefore, the work on the political ecology of the state should properly 
investigate the historico-geographical origins of the false promises of environmental 
governance. These can be found in the innovative elaboration on the flexibility and 
legitimisation of the emerging liberal capitalist state by Georg Hegel. The new state 
formation was seen by Hegel as a safe way forward in a world (in his case, Prussia) still 
dominated by centralisation, despotism and lack of dynamism. As one of the most 
creative, and ambitious, philosophers of the first period of industrial capitalism, Hegel 
put forward a visionary political philosophy that has since then influenced generations 
of intellectuals.  
 
Environmental Governance and the Realisation of Hegelian Statecraft 
 
Hegel developed a peculiar political elaboration through a sustained emphasis 
on the coincidence between world history and rationality that served to situate the state 
as the guarantor of systematic reason. According to Hegel, the whole ethical basis of 
the state emanates from the Idea, the spirit, the absolute essence (Bobbio 1995). This 
claim proved to be highly instrumental for the advance of reformist, conservative 
political agendas, or at least helps to understand the tension between old and new state 
institutions (as in the case of environmental governance). In his main political text, 
Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel indicated that the ultimate endeavour of 
public affairs was to “apprehend and present the state as something inherently rational” 
(Hegel 2008: 15). Already in the preface, Hegel unleashes his infamous claim that 
“what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational”, which means to reaffirm that 
reason is an actual power in the world. The realisation (‘actualisation’, in the Hegelian 
terminology) of reason is the purpose of the state, as the defender of social order and 
the conciliator of conflicts of interest. For Hegel, history evolves through dialectics and 
towards the attainment of the ‘Absolute’, that is, the self-reflective appropriation of the 
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whole process of national and international development. This was a clear attempt to 
restore the Platonic conceptualisation of the perfect state governed by those that 
excelled in philosophy and military art, a range of unpaid officers with great authority 
and moral rectitude (cf. Book VIII of The Republic). 
It was accurately observed by Habermas (1984) that Hegel was the first thinker 
for whom Western modernity was a philosophical problem. In effect, Hegel could be 
considered the initial philosopher of modernity and of the hegemonic spreading of 
capitalist values and institutions (Rockmore 1989). Beyond the liberalism of Locke, the 
utilitarianism of Mill and Bentham, and the rationalisation of Weber, the political and 
moral claims of Hegel provided the intellectual tools for the consolidation of the 
capitalist state. Hegel insisted on the unification of tradition and modernity according 
to ‘rational’ approaches and beyond the constraints of religion. Unlike the tradition of 
English liberal philosophers, Hegel didn’t see the state as primarily the safeguard of 
people’s self-interest, but as the guardian of a moral life and universal altruism (Avineri 
1972). Hegel’s state system actually only makes sense as the human approximation of 
the perfect model, that is, the concept of a moral state to be pursued through ethical life. 
In that sense, Hegel claimed to resolve the fundamental tension between the public and 
private through a ‘mediation of the will’ between the family, civil society and the state. 
Because the state is seen as ‘inherently rational’, it could become the main promoter of 
reason and the main force in the course of historic-geographical change. Consequently, 
conceived as the domain of reason and legitimacy, the Hegelian state is the natural 
advocate of environmental governance and its associated calls for rationalisation and 
efficiency.  
Hegel’s political blueprint is supposedly able to reconcile renovation and 
permanence, rupture and legality, democratic inclusion and, whenever needed, political 
repression. As a result, the political philosophy of Hegel offered, even indirectly, the 
intellectual toolbox needed to update the outmoded environmental regulation of the 
welfare-developmentalist state. Decisive elements of Hegel’s political argument can be 
found in this superimposition of environmental governance – portrayed as the 
expression of wisdom, higher democracy and scientific aptness – over a socionatural 
reality with growing environmental impacts and associated conflicts. Instead of merely 
the manifestation of biopolitics or biopower, the introduction of environmental 
governance replicates the civilisational character of the state proposed by Hegel for the 
administration and leadership of the expanding industrial-capitalist society of the time. 
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In that sense, the most influential aspect of Hegel’s argument is exactly the adaptability 
of his constitutional plan above the bare affirmation of power and immediate 
socioeconomic demands. In a remarkable comment, Hegel (1964: 281) even makes use 
of a proto-ecological metaphor to affirm that their fundamental error is to focus too 
much on positive, rigid law, acting “like a landed proprietor whose sandy soil has been 
covered by fertile humus as a result of a beneficent flood and who yet proposed to 
plough and farm it exactly as he had done before”. 
One of central tasks that Hegel set up for his philosophy of politics was the 
reconciliation of the individual with the state, with the community and the environment 
(Plant 1973). This suggestion was rather innovative in his own time and, more 
importantly, anticipated the emphasis on sustainability and public participation that 
became core aspects of environmental governance. The ‘police’ approach proposed by 
Hegel (i.e. the combination of a rational state, profitable market transactions and some 
moderation of social inequalities) re-emerged later in the attempts to transform the 
responses to environmental degradation into strategies for capital accumulation. 
Although Hegel cautioned against the excesses of a laissez-faire economy, as much as 
against too much state interventionism, his rationalisation of state interventions has a 
contingent relationship with wider neoliberal trends. Hegel’s argument in favour of 
persistent economic inequalities, as the basis of social progress, is intended to provide 
justification for economic growth at the expense of environmental concerns. A flexible 
state apparatus, shielded by the rhetoric of sustainability and public participation, 
creates many opportunities for the neoliberalisation of nature and the creation of new 
mechanisms for the circulation of capital through nature conservation (Katz 1998). 
Examples of that include the payment for ecosystem services, carbon markets and the 
privatisation of water utilities, which are all advocated as the most efficient and socially 
responsive forms of natural resource management. 
 
Critically Assessing the Hegelian Influence 
 
The main claim of this article is that the unsustainability of the hegemonic 
agenda of sustainable development can be ultimately explained by the Hegelian claims 
of the identity between the real and the rational (i.e. the real is rational by definition). 
Calls for ‘ecological protection’ by the contemporary state have been undermined by 
the parallel legitimisation of politico-economic structures responsible for systematic 
and widespread socioecological impacts. Despite its internal logic and pragmatist 
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appeal, the grand plans for the formation rational, ethical state have been fundamentally 
contained by the very reasoning of the Hegelian political thinking and his defence of 
state’s supreme authority and legitimacy. In effect, the alleged victory over absolutism 
and irrationality defended by Hegel is, from the perspective of social and environmental 
justice, only a pyrrhic victory. Following the Hegelian model, the contemporary state 
is the historical necessity of capitalist relations, but it is also predicated upon those same 
relations and the myriad of socionatural impacts thus produced. As pointed out by Negri 
(2011), the interior completeness of the Hegelian scheme has nourished and at the same 
time imprisoned the philosophical and political thought of the 19th and 20th Centuries. 
The Hegelian political elaboration is ultimately a cunning trap – the ‘Hegelian trap’ – 
left by the Pre-Victorian Era for the contemporary, post-Berlin Wall period. 
The primary loyalty of the Hegelian state is not with the communities of 
individuals, but with the fulfilment of the functions connected to economic and political 
freedom. The proclamation of the advantages and qualities of the contemporary state, 
at least from the perspective of political elites and hegemonic economic interests, 
reinforces the perversity of the ‘Hegelian trap’, as the clever, but deceitful, defence of 
the Western configuration of the state. For Hegel the individual and the state are 
interconnected and interdependent, but this relationship can only happen if the rule of 
law preserves the existing institutions of private property and the hierarchisation of 
political life (Hegel in Realphilosophie, quoted in Avineri 1973). On the one hand, the 
state is proclaimed the manifestation of an ethical Idea, the actualisation of freedom; on 
the other hand the supreme duty of the individual is to become a subordinate member 
of the state. The result is not simply a harmonic separation between private and public 
life, as claimed by Hegel, but a frontal antagonism between the functions of the state 
(predicated as right in advance, as the state brings freedom and reason) and the actuality 
of private life (in Hegelian terms, logically containing a lower level of rationality). The 
‘Hegelian trap’ has the ultimate consequence in the crystallisation of social inequalities 
at the cost of legitimating and accelerating the exploitation of the workers and low-
income groups. If things go really wrong, the ultimate recommendation of Hegel was 
then geographical: expand colonisation and transfer part of the population to other parts 
of the world (Hegel 2008).  
Bustamante et al. (2012) present a compelling example of the lasting, subtle 
legacy of the ‘Hegelian trap’ and its expansion to the socionature in the non-Western 
world. In Bolivia, the government of Evo Morales has formally institutionalised the 
 11 
right to water in the new national constitutional order under the claim that it was part 
of its pro-Indian and pro-poor policies. Although on paper it seems an important 
democratic measure, Bustamante et al. (2012) criticise the simplistic discourse on rights 
and its manipulation as part of the intensified exploitation of water resources (aiming, 
in particular, to sell hydroelectricity to Brazil and to safeguard the interests of the larger 
irrigators) and the promotion of industrialisation (what is being called the ‘great 
industrial leap’). In this case, a democratically elected government, with unique rhetoric 
commitments to the Bolivian poor, has ended up operating within a spurious Hegelian 
logic and, as a result, imposing mediation between state, nature and society that 
prioritises the conventional model of economic growth and private property 
accumulation. The Morales government cannot be blamed for policies that are simply 
utilitarian and pro-capitalism (vis-à-vis his confrontation of the international capitalist 
order and concrete poverty alleviation measures), but can certainly be criticised for its 
Hegelian mystification of the balance of rights and gains. From this example it can be 
inferred that Hegel provided enough flexibility for the national state to adapt and mutate 
to other geographical contexts (much beyond the European and German circumstances 
of the first half of the 19th Century). 
Among the many critics of Hegel, Marx (1970) – an author who was influenced 
but struggled during his entirely life to go beyond Hegelian idealism – specifically 
rejected the view that the state could be described as an all-encompassing political 
community functioning according to an ethical appeal and acting as the fulfilment of 
reason. On the contrary, for Marx the capitalist state operates at the contradiction 
between the interest of the individual and that of the community, but always taking 
sides in favour of the stronger classes (to the extent that “struggles within the State (…) 
are merely the illusory forms in which the real struggles of the different classes are 
fought out among one another”, Marx and Engels 1974: 53). In the preface to A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx (1975) showed how Hegel, 
through a skilful handling of ethics and dialectics, ultimately reduced civil society to 
economic society (something extremely relevant to understand the ambiguities of the 
European Union settlement). In particular, Marx (1970) recognised a distinctive 
mystification in Hegel’s defence of the Christian, democratic state. In following 
Hegelian political philosophy, the perfect Christian state effectively becomes the most 
perfect atheist state, to the extent that it is still theological but relegates religion to the 
level of civil society. For Marx, Christian capitalism thus becomes the human basis of 
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a state that uses mystification (through religion and politics) to maintain the basis of 
exploitation. 
Marx’s critique of Hegel prefigured the problems of contemporary 
environmental politics, which are nothing else than a form of sovereignty in search of 
a subject, particularly the idea of planetary governance structuring hegemonic 
responses and operating like a caricature of Hegelian necessity (Wainwright and Mann 
2013). One of the core elements of Marx’s critique is that Hegel’s politico-
philosophical argument idealised the role of state bureaucracy and the significance of 
the crown. Hegel located the ultimate authority and legitimacy in the hands of the 
monarch, as the repository of maximum wisdom and independent judgment. Although 
Hegel attempted to bring together state and civil society, following the appeal for reason 
and liberty, in effect he created a fixed opposition and placed the state outside and above 
civil society. Instead of democracy and general suffrage, Hegel wants the individuals 
taking part in politics “as all”, as a coherent group, rather than as individuals (Marx 
1970: 117). For Hegel, the resolution of social discrepancies could happen through the 
work of the Assembly of Estates (i.e. the parliament), which is the essential mediation 
between people and the political state. The legislature (i.e. the convergence of the 
estates) is thus seen as totality of interests “not only in itself but also for itself” (Hegel 
2008: 287). The state is, thus, portrayed by Hegel as a complex organism that functions 
through estates, the executive and the crown, in which power is supposedly shared in a 
coordinated way that theoretically assures the perfect, rational government. But for 
Marx, the subjective freedoms announced by Hegel end up becoming formal, inexistent 
freedoms for the (majority) of the people. Marx saw great risks associated with the 
Hegelian institutional arrangement, which was likely to serve mainly the interests of 
the propertied classes and high bureaucracy. Expressing his criticism of Hegel’s 
political treatise, Marx claimed that “[t]he main thing is to fight against the 
constitutional monarchy as a hybrid creature, full of internal contradictions and bound 
to be self-destroying” (in a letter to Ruge on 20/03/1842, mentioned in Avineri 1968: 
9). 
The main point is that Marx explicitly denounced the mystification of the 
emerging capitalist state by Hegel. It was in his analysis of the prospects of religious 
freedom that Marx subverted the conventional argument about political and religious 
emancipation. For him, the political emancipation of the religious person requires, first 
of all, the emancipation of the state from religion. In other words, it was not enough to 
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secure additional political rights within the impact of private property relations 
promoted and defended by the capitalist state (Marx 1975). In order to become a 
genuine social being (instead of only an abstract citizen), the individuals needs to secure 
first their human emancipation, which depends on overcoming the separation of the 
individual from social forces proposed by Hegel and other prophets of the capitalist 
world. According to Marx, contradiction of the capitalist state is complete and can be 
demonstrated by its support of religion. The perfect Christian state is exactly the atheist 
state (such as in the United States), which granted religious freedom as artefact to 
promote and consolidate a highly religious society. Likewise, the environmental agenda 
of the modern state, with its sophisticated green discourse and complex regulatory 
apparatus, has become the champion of widespread environmental degradation and 
socionatural impacts. When Marx identified this fundamental failure in the political 
agenda of the capitalist state, the fallacy of the Hegelian argument is inescapably 
revealed and the only way ahead is to pursue a radically transformed, and effectively 
ecologised, state. 
 
Beyond Environmental Governance and its Hegelian References 
 
The fundamental conclusion from the above is that this is a central, crucial 
debate for human geographers and other scholars interested in unpacking the 
complexity of environmental policies and the widening gap between official discourses 
and actual practices. It is evident that the disagreement between Marx and Hegel must 
be examined in the light of what has been learned since the lifetime of both 
philosophers. Still, the apparently enlightened states that exist in the world today, such 
as the European Union constitutional order, contain a profound paradox that can only 
be properly appreciated with the help of Marx’s reading of the Hegelian idealisation of 
the state: the paradox of achieving all and nothing at the same time. The application of 
detailed science, parliamentary law-making and systematic public consultation may 
give the impression that the state is effectively moving towards higher levels of 
sustainability and ecological citizenship. In effect, the environmental action of the 
contemporary state is shrouded in mystification, elitism and manipulation. The 
Hegelian constitutional plan informed the organisation of environmental governance 
around two key principles, flexibility and legitimacy, which have facilitated the 
advance of conservative reforms, such as described in the rhetoric of ecological 
modernisation and sustainable development. The pseudo-democracy of the post-Berlin 
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Wall period includes, as another manifestation of the creative domination of capitalist 
structures, the pseudo-sustainability of the mainstream sustainability agenda. 
On the one hand, the flexible and apparently responsive basis of the 
contemporary environmental regulation has been directly and indirectly informed by 
the Hegelian distortions of state politics. Environmental regulation is produced 
primarily to serve the wider, self-perpetuating demands of the state and its stronger 
allies. Environmental statecraft, according to the Hegelian plan, continues to be 
strategic in the changes of natural resources ownership and manipulation of 
socionature. On the other hand, despite the ingeniousness of the Hegelian model, the 
responsive capacity of conventional environmental regulation is also increasing 
showing signs of inadequacy and exhaustion. Notwithstanding the growing complexity 
of state policies and agencies, environmental problems and tensions keep expanding in 
space, scale and intricacy. The Hegelian approach to public policy has represented a 
true distortion of the causes and consequences of environmental problems, in the sense 
that the top priorities of public policies are the reinforcement of the rationality 
associated with the extraction of surplus value from the workforce and the exchange 
values of nature. This contradictory relationship brings political ecology to the centre 
of the structure and functioning of the modern capitalist state. The level of protest and 
contestation depends on the realisation of the connection between environmental 
problems, socioeconomic trends and the political commitments of the state apparatus. 
In practice, environmental regulation is not a linear or predetermined process, but it 
unfolds according to the concreteness of political pressures and the resistance of 
grassroots groups.  
The central dilemma for geographers and other scholars of environmental 
governance is to identify the changes in the rationale and configuration of the state and 
relate them to the wider balance of political power hindering state action. The challenge 
is to go beyond conservative claims of common responsibility and the technocratism of 
environmental management in order to underscore the fairness and emancipatory 
character of the responses to socionatural problems. Environmental management only 
makes sense if it is positioned in the centre of wider processes of politico-economic 
emancipation. Otherwise, it will remain merely an adjunct of prevailing socioeconomic 
trends in need of some peripheral forms of mitigation. The fundamental antinomies of 
flexibility and legitimacy of contemporary environmental policies need to be 
questioned and overcome. It is not enough to liberate the state from the burden of 
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environmental degradation and resolve the tensions blocking conventional economic 
relations if the majority of socionature remains in a condition of exploitation and 
subordination. As observed by Marx (1975), it is the manner of emancipation that needs 
to be criticised, given that the state can liberate itself (from religion, in the case of 
Marx's analysis) without people being set free. In that regard, the fundamental 
distortions of conservative democratic claims “must be looked for in the nature of the 
state itself” (Marx 1975: 217). 
The key ontological and political question is less how the state deals with the 
environmental policies and strategies per se, but what its ultimate commitments are and 
how it works to reinforce or eliminate processes of exclusion and exploitation. 
Democracy between the human and the non-human, between present and future 
generations is never going to be secured if the basis of economic production and social 
reproduction remain subordinated to the imperatives of capital accumulation. Instead 
of generating conflicts to preserve the interest of a small percentage of society, this 
new, refunded state should be beyond the lasting influence of Hegelian idealism and 
mystique. That requires sustained and radical transformations in small, specific state 
practices and also in wider commitments and interventions of the state. What is more, 
the transformation of existing state formations should happen both from the outside and 
from the inside of the state. According to Marx (2012: 44) in The Civil War in France, 
“the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery” but it 
needs to be profoundly altered, as much as economy and society need to change. In the 
end, those multiple answers to socionatural disputes around the state should become a 
main unifying catalyst that brings together sociopolitical emancipation and a just, 
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